In the course of six days in June of 1967, Israel captured the Golan Heights
from Syria, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Gaza strip
from Egypt. Israeli law has since been applied to the Golan Heights. The West
Bank and Gaza were never officially annexed to the Jewish state. Most of the
international community recognizes Israel only in its pre-June 1967 borders.
Moderate Israelis and Palestinians understand that a two state solution to the
conflict between them must be based on a return to these frontiers. It is only
within them that a Jewish majority exists. And yet, the pre 1967 borders, otherwise
known as ‘the green line,’ are not marked in any of the textbooks
Israeli students use in their studies. As far as any young Israeli looking at
an atlas is concerned, Judea, Samaria, and even Gaza, are as much a part of
her country as Haifa and Tel Aviv are.
Earlier this December, Yael Tamir, Israel’s minister of education, decided
to address this anomaly and ordered that the green line be marked in maps and
text books. The argument she offered for her decision was clear enough: Israel
could not demand that other Arab countries recognize its right to exist within
the 1967 borders if it officially ignores those borders.
This line of thought makes good sense, but I believe there is a more fundamental
justification for Tamir’s decision. The lack of a clearly defined eastern
border has turned Israel into a political Rorschach blurb onto which different
political groups can project their fantasies and aspirations. The state’s
amorphousness has allowed the ideological hardcore of the settler movement to
portray it as a revival of the biblical empire promised by god to the Jews.
At the same time this formlessness has furnished anti-Zionists with a basis
for describing Israel as an apartheid state, since it raises the specter that,
within a few years, a minority of Jews will forcefully rule over a territory
populated mostly by Arabs. Finally, the lack of a clearly defined eastern border
has provided the grounds for the surreal proposal that the entire area between
the Mediterranean and the river Jordan be turned into one, bi-national state,
erasing the distinction between Israeli and Palestinian national identities.
The 1967 borders are the only frontiers that make sense of Israel’s self-
understanding as a Jewish Democratic state.
And when all is said and done that understanding, with all its inconsistencies,
is still the only game in town. If Israel wishes to return to a sustainable,
morally defensible version of itself it must eventually converge back to the
green line. Tamir has correctly understood that such a convergence requires
reinstating the green line into the mental geography of the young. Whether or
not maps can actually change minds remains to be seen. Even if they cannot,
Tamir’s step carries a great deal of symbolic import. A map is a national
self-portrait of sorts, declaring ‘this is how we look.’ For the
first time in quite a while, Israel’s self-portrait, though still quite
a ways from reflecting actual political reality, is beginning to seem attractive.